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Studies  offering  a  formal  description  of  interest  group  behaviour  aimed  at  influencing  govern- 
ment  policy  typically  use  an  ‘influence  function’  to  represent  the  transformation  of  resources  into 
political  influence.  A  formal  model  of  the  interaction  underlying  this  transformation,  however, 
appears  to  be  lacking:  the  pressure  process  itself  is  treated  as  a  ‘black  box’.  In  this  paper  we  try 
to  shed  some  light  on  this  process.  To  that  purpose  the  paper  starts  out  with  a  formalization  of 
political  pressure,  central  to  which  is  the  transmission  of  information.  Then  a  simple  but  basic 
game  is  presented  formalizing  the  interaction  between  a  government  and  an  interest  group.  It  is 
shown  that  pressure  can  be  part  of  a  sequential  equilibrium.  The  results  and  insights  obtained 
from  the  model  are  discussed  and  evaluated  in  a  broader  game-theoretical  perspective. 
1.  Introduction 
Many  students  of  political  economy  have  emphasized  that  the  behaviour 
of  political  rulers  (the  government)  should  at  least  partly  be  explained  by  the 
influence  of  different  interest  groups  in  society.  The  way  such  groups  are 
typically  said  to  achieve  their  goals  with  these  rulers  is  through  the  exertion 
of  political  pressure.  Alternatively,  these  interest  groups  are,  therefore,  also 
referred  to  as  pressure  groups.  Surprisingly  perhaps  -  and,  indeed,  some 
recent  studies  might  suggest  otherwise  -  models  that  explicitly  formalize 
political  pressure,  including  its  impact  on  government  behaviour,  are  comple- 
tely  lacking,  as  will  be  discussed  below. 
The  predominant  formal  approach  to  interest  groups  treats  the  political 
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process  as  more  or  less  similar  to  a  market.  The  interaction  between  the 
participants  in  this  process  is  viewed  as  an  exchange  like  relationship.  The 
‘goods’  supplied  by  politicians  and  bureaucrats  are  certain  government 
policies  (legislation,  regulation,  transfers,  public  goods).  The  interest  groups 
are  the  demanders  of  these  goods,  their  ‘price’  being  the  amount  of  pressure 
by  the  groups  directed  towards  the  polity.  The  (game)  models  by  Becker 
(1983),  Findlay  and  Wellisz  (1982),  Rogerson  (1982)  and  Tullock  (1980) 
follow  this  approach.  A  characteristic  feature  of  these  models  is  the  use  of  an 
injluence  function  to  represent  the  supply  of  government  policies  in  response 
to  the  pressures  by  the  different  groups  (rent-seekers).  These  models  provide 
some  important  insights,  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  amount  of  resources 
spent  by  the  groups  in  their  competition  for  political  influence.  An  unsatis- 
factory  aspect  of  these  models,  however,  is  that  it  is  simply  assumed  that 
pressure  is  produced  by  spending  resources  (money,  labor  or  capital)  and 
that  the  government’s  response  to  this  pressure  is  in  accordance  with  the 
influence  function.  A  formal  analysis  of  the  (kind  of)  activities  involved  when 
putting  a  government  under  pressure  is  lacking.  Moreover,  since  the 
government  is  not  modelled  as  a  player  in  the  game  but  is  assumed  to 
behave  mechanistically,  it  is  not  indicated  or  explained  within  the  models 
why  pressure  has  an  impact  on  government  policy.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded 
that  the  pressure  process  -  its  production  and  impact  on  government 
behaviour  -  is  (largely)  treated  as  a  ‘black  box’. 
There  are  also  a  few  studies  that  concentrate  on  one  specific  activity  used 
by  interest  groups  to  affect  public  policy,  namely  election  campaign  contribu- 
tions.  Two  different  approaches  can  be  distinguished  here.  In  the  first  type  of 
models  [see  Aranson  and  Hinich  (1979),  Welch  (1980)]  interest  groups 
contribute  to  the  campaigns  of  candidates  or  parties  in  order  to  affect  the 
policy  position  they  will  take  when  elected.  It  is  assumed  that  the  utility  a 
group  derives  from  an  elected  candidate’s  behaviour  is  an  increasing  function 
of  the  level  of  contributions  to  this  candidate.  Hence,  these  models  suffer 
from  a  similar  drawback  as  the  models  employing  an  influence  function.  It  is 
assumed  that,  but  not  explained  why,  a  candidate’s  behaviour  changes  in 
response  to  campaign  contributions  (pressure).  In  the  second  type  of  models 
[see  Austen-Smith  (1987)  Magee  and  Brock  (1983)]  interest  groups  contri- 
bute  to  campaigns  in  order  to  increase  the  probability  that  favoured 
candidates  are  elected.  In  doing  so,  however,  they  are  assumed  to  take  the 
policy  position  of  the  candidates  or  parties  as  given.  Thus,  in  these  models 
interest  groups  aim  to  affect  the  behaviour  of  voters  -  and  indirectly  the 
personnel  composition  of  the  government  -  but  not  the  behaviour  of 
candidates  or  parties,  Although  affecting  voter  behaviour  is,  of  course,  an 
(indirect)  means  to  influence  public  policy,  it  can  be  argued  that  behaviour 
alluded  to  in  phrases  like  ‘exerting  pressure  on  the  government’  in  particular 
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present  in  power.  In  this  sense,  also  these  studies  do  not  model  political 
pressure. 
The  policy  relevance  ascribed  to  the  activities  of  pressure  groups  in  the 
literature,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  lack  of  behavioural  models  of  political 
pressure  that  explicitly  formalize  its  production  as  well  as  its  impact  on  the 
behaviour  of  the  political  rulers,  on  the  other  hand,  motivate  the  present 
paper.  In  the  following  section,  first,  a  preliminary  description  of  pressure 
and  some  illustrative  examples  are  presented,  which  justify  the  formalization 
that  is  subsequently  given.  The  proposed  formalization  captures,  in  our  view, 
a  fundamental  feature  of  (most  cases  of)  pressure:  the  transmission  of 
information.  Then,  in  section  3, a  simple  game-theoretical  model  is  presented, 
modelling  the  interaction  between  a  government  and  an  interest  group  and 
incorporating  the  phenomenon  of  political  pressure  as  defined.  More  specifi- 
cally,  pressure  will  be  shown  to  be  part  of  the  sequential  equilibrium  of  the 
game.  Section  4  goes  into  some  possible  extensions  of  this  model.  Finally,  in 
section  5,  the  results  and  insights  from  the  model,  along  with  some 
suggestions  for  further  research,  are  discussed  and  evaluated  in  a  broader 
game-theoretical  perspective. 
For  anyone  only  slightly  familiar  with  the  present  problem  area  it  should 
be  clear  that  one  cannot  expect  from  this  paper  a  final  answer  to  the  highly 
intricate  theoretical  and  technical  problems  that  are  involved.  Our  aim  is 
much  more  modest  than  that.  It  is  only  hoped  that  it  may  contribute  to  a 
more  solid  foundation  for  the  study  and  modelling  of  pressure-group 
behaviour. 
2.  Political  pressure  as  transmission  of  information 
2.1.  A  preliminary  description  of  political  pressure 
The  International  Encyclopedia  of  the  Social  Sciences  (1972)  does  not 
directly  provide  a  definition  or  description  of  (political)  pressure.  Gross  (Vol. 
12, p.  269)  in  writing  on  the  Political  process,  however,  states  that  ‘pressure  is 
applied  by  A  upon  B  whenever  A  tries  to  make  a  course  of  action  more 
desirable  by  promising  or  threatening  contingent  rewards  or  punishments’. 
Also  authors  like  De  Jong  (1959)  and  Salisbury  (1975,  p.  176)  take  pressure 
to  imply  the  use  of  sanctions.  Since  this  description  seems  to  translate  what 
is  commonly  understood  by  this  term,  it  will  serve  as  our  point  of  departure 
here. 
Note,  first,  that  this  description  implies  that  the  intention  to  influence 
should  be  present  (an  influence  attempt).  It  excludes  behaviour  that  uninten- 
dedly  or  as  a  ‘by-product’  affects  the  behaviour  of  political  rulers.’ 
‘Cartwright  (1969,  p.  132)  in  writing  on  influence  attempts  notes:  ‘Although  some  theorists 
object  to  the  use  of  the  concept  of  intention  because  of  its  ‘subjective’  nature,  there  is  real  doubt 
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Obviously,  a  group’s  behaviour  may  have  an  influence  on  the  behaviour  of  a 
governmental  agent  even  if  the  intention  to  influence  is  absent.  Tax  evasion 
or  avoidance,  e.g.,  may  clearly  affect  government  policy  but  typically  involves 
adaptive  behaviour,  in  contrast  with  tax  revolts.  However,  only  in  the  latter 
case  it  would  be  appropriate  to  speak  of  pressure  by  the  tax  payers.  The 
former  type  of  influence  on  government  behaviour  may  be  labelled  ‘structural 
coercion’,  which  we  take  to  comprise  all  types  of  influence  and  constraints  on 
government  behaviour  which  are  not  due  to  influence  attempts.’  The 
presence  of  an  intention  to  influence  further  implies  that  the  agent  (interest 
group)  exerting  pressure  expects  the  governmental  agent  to  consequently 
change  its  behaviour,  however  slight  this  expectation  (probability)  may  be. 
The  description  leaves  open,  though,  whether  or  not  the  attempt  to  influence 
is  in  fact  successful. 
Secondly,  note  that  the  description  demands  the  presence  of  a  contingent 
reward  or  punishment,  that  is,  a  claim  and  a  sanction.  The  conditional 
character  of  the  sanction  serves  as  an  incentive  to  the  agent  under  pressure 
to  indeed  change  its  behaviour.  Although,  pressure  is  sometime  associated 
with  (utility)  losses  for  those  under  pressure  this  need  not  be  the  case  here. 
Neither  does  it  necessarily  involve  illegal  or  furtive  behaviour. 
Finally,  it  seems  unduly  restrictive  to  interpret  the  above  description  as 
demanding  that  the  rewards  and  punishments  implied  by  the  sanctions  are 
always  produced  by  the  very  agent  trying  to  influence  government  behaviour. 
One  would  like  to  allow  for  cases  -  illustrated  below  -  where  an  interest 
group  points  at  certain  (dis)advantageous  consequences  of  government 
behaviour  due  to  other  agents. 
Now,  both  types  of  influence  attempts  referred  to  can  be  represented 
by  the  following  scheme:  an  interest  group  f  has  a  certain  claim  or  demand 
(x)  with  respect  to  the  behaviour  of  a  governmental  agent  g  and  transmits 
this  claim  to  g,  packaged  with  an  incentive  of  a  conditional  nature  (a 
sanction  y)  for  g  to  concede  to  the  claim.  In  other  words,  political  pressure 
as  described  involves  the  intended  transmission  of  information  by  f  to  g,  of 
the  form:  ‘y will  happen  if and  only  if you  do  x’,  in  short  ‘y iff 2. 
Consider,  for  instance,  a  strike  (or  a  threat  to  strike)  by  a  union  of  public 
sector  workers  f  against  a  (proposed)  wage  cut  by  the  government.  This 
action  will  typically  be  shaped  -  perhaps  with  phrases  like  ‘we  won’t  take  it 
any  longer’  -  as  to  convey  the  signal  that  the  strike  will  continue  (or  start)  if 
and  only  if  the  proposal  to  cut  wages  in  not  withdrawn:  ‘y  iff x’.  In  addition 
this  action  will  be  intended  to  change  government  behaviour.  Such  direct 
threats,  or  promises,  by  f  are  in  accordance  with  the  above  scheme  of 
information  transmission. 
But  also  actions  that  aim  at  influencing  g’s  behaviour  by  means  of 
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influencing  the  public’s  attitude  about  g’s  (future)  behaviour  may  conform  to 
this  scheme  and  can,  thus,  be  labelled  as  pressure.  In  the  Netherlands,  for 
example,  the  car  industry  has  tried  to  influence  the  government’s  road  policy 
by  working  at  the  public’s  attitude,  in  a  way  that  could  not  escape  the 
government’s  attention.  In  this  case  the  incentive  y  is  not  an  action  by  f  (the 
car  industry)  but  the  potentially  changing  behaviour  (e.g.,  voting)  of  the 
public. 
Cases  of  advising  or  persuasion  also  lit  into  this  scheme  of  pressure.  For 
example,  a  trade  association  may  point  at  the  adverse  consequences  (y)  for 
the  budget  deficit  or  the  level  of  employment  of  a  certain  policy  (x),  thereby 
transmitting  the  information  ‘y iffx’.  Provided  that  the  trade  association 
intends  to  influence  the  government’s  behaviour,  its  advice  should  be  referred 
to  as  pressure,  according  to  the  above  description. 
It  should  perhaps  be  emphasized  here  that  this  broad  category  of  influence 
attempts,  which  we  propose  to  call  pressure,  does  not  cover  the  whole  range 
of  means  by  which  an  interest  group  can  try  to  influence  governmental 
policy.  For  instance,  an  interest  group  may  provide  certain  new  (dis)advan- 
tages  of  certain  actions  for  the  government  subject  to  no  condition  on  the 
government’s  behaviour.  Put  differently,  f  can  take  an  action  which  directly 
changes  the  benefits  to  the  government  of  a  certain  action,  without  a  claim 
and  sanction.  For  example,  one  country  f  may  provide  another  country  g 
with  arms  subject  to  no  condition,  just  to  facilitate  g  to  attack  a  third 
country,  which  is  hostile  to  both.  3  Another  type  of  influence  attempt  not 
covered  by  our  description  of  pressure  concerns  the  penetration  of  a 
governmental  organization  with  the  intention  to  influence  its  behaviour.  For 
example,  by  having  representatives  penetrate  a  governmental  agency  or 
decision-making  body  (through  elections  or  employment)  interest  groups 
may  attempt  to  influence  political  decision-making  from  within. 
2.2.  A formalization  qf  political  pressure 
We  will  now  try  to  arrive  at  a  more  rigorous  definition  of  the  kind  of 
influence  attempt  described  as  pressure.  Because  it  was  concluded  that 
pressure  involves  the  transmission  of  information  we  consider  to  that 
purpose  the  decision-making  problem  of  an  agent  g  under  incomplete 
information  [cf.  Hirshleifer  and  Riley  (1979)].  Assume  that  this  agent  is  to 
take  an  action  x  from  a  set  of  feasible  actions  X,  and  that  all  relevant  aspects 
3This  type  of  influence  attempt  and  the  example  are  due  to  Harsanyi  (1962).  Harsanyi 
distinguishes  four  broad  means  by  which  an  agent  1  can  try  to  influence  another  agent  g,  two  of 
which  are  covered  by  our  description  of  pressure.  The  fourth  means  which  Harsanyi  dis- 
tinguishes  is  that  f  may  rely  on  its  legitimate  authority  over  g.  or  on  g’s  personal  affection  for  1: 
In  this  case  one  could  say  that  the  sanctions  are  produced  by  g  itself  (they  are  internalized). 
Note  that  this  is  allowed  for  by  our  description  of  pressure.  Also  the  sanction  may  be  due  to 
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of  ‘reality’  as  perceived  by  g  can  be  represented  by  a  variable  s  which  can 
take  n  possible  values:  s E {si,  .  . . , s,},  representing  n  different  states  of  the 
world.  Different  states  of  the  world  here  in  particular  involve  different 
reaction  patterns  to  x  (sanctions)  by  other  agents.  Assume  that  g’s  prefer- 
ences  can  be  represented  by  a  utility  function  G(x,s),  over  the  consequences 
of  action-state  pairs.  Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  g  has  beliefs  P:= 
(P Ir..  . , I’,),  representing  the  subjective  probabilities  g  attaches  to  the  differ- 
ent  states  (g’s  ‘conception  of  reality’). 
Generally  speaking,  a  decision  rule  (or  strategy)  o  will  be  a  mapping  from 
the  space  of  beliefs  P  onto  the  set  of  feasible  actions  X,  given  G: o(P  1  G) E X. 
Usually,  the  utility  function  is  assumed  to  be  fixed  and  the  decision  rule  is 
assumed  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  maximization  of  expected  utility. 
Applying  the  expected  utility  rule  we  arrive  at  an  expected  utility  function  G’ 
over  the  actions  x E X,  for  given  beliefs  P: 
Ge(x; P): =  .f  PiG(x,si). 
i=l 
(1) 
Assuming  expected  utility  maximization,  the  agent’s  optimal  action  as  a 
function  of  its  beliefs  a(P)  is  an  element,  x’,  of  the  set  of  undominated 
actions: 
(2) 
If  agent  g  gets  new  information,  m  say,  regarding  the  state  of  the  world  - 
e.g.,  by  observing  (re)actions,  receiving  announcements  or  threats  -  this  may 
lead  g  to  update  its  prior  beliefs,  denoted  by  P”,  to  posterior  beliefs  Pm, such 
that  P”#  P”.  The  subjective  value  of  infbrmation  m  for  g,  v(m),  can  thus  be 
defined  as: 
v(m): = G’(o(P”);  Pm) -  G’(a(P”);  Pm).  (3) 
This  value  is  necessarily  non-negative.  Furthermore,  if  v(m)  is  positive  then 
the  updated  beliefs  P m  induce  g  to  take  an  action  xm  different  from  the 
action  x0 g  would  have  taken  if it  had  not  received  the  information  m: 
v(m)>O*x”:=  a(P”)  #x0:=  cr(P’).  (4) 
Now  recall  our  description  of  pressure  as  those  influence  attempts  where 
transmission  of  information  by  agent  f  to  agent  g  are  involved.  Given  the 
foregoing  decision-making  model,  if  f  wants  to  put  pressure  on  g,  f  will J.  Potters  and  F.  van  Winden,  Modelling  political pressure  67 
have  to  take  an  action  that  changes  g’s  beliefs  concerning  the  state  of  the 
world  s,  and  thereby  g’s  behaviour  (through  an  implied  sanction).  In  the 
sequel  we  will  call  any  action  that  f  expects  to  have  an  impact  on  g’s  beliefs 
a  signal.  If  a  signal  as  such  is  costly  -  that  is,  if a  signal  is  not  a  ‘by-product’ 
from  an  in  itself  profitable  action  (cf.  our  discussion  of  tax  evasion  and  tax 
revolts  in  the  previous  subsection)  -  utility  maximizing  behaviour  on  the  side 
of  the  transmitter  f  then  implies  that  f  expects  its  signal  to  change  g’s 
behaviour.  Furthermore,  it  implies  that  f’s  signal  is  intended  to  change  g’s 
behaviour,  in  a  way  that  best  fits  f’s  preferences  (through  the  implied  claim). 
Consequently,  we  arrive  at  the  following  formal  definition  of  political 
pressure:  agent  f  exerts  political  pressure  if  it  sends  a  costly  signal  -  as 
defined  -  to  a governmental  agent  g.4 
The  following  remarks  are  important  with  respect  to  this  definition. 
(a)  It  is  important  to  note  that  if  g  receives  information  with  a  positive 
subjective  value  this  only  implies  that  g  expects  to  benefit  from  the  induced 
change  of  action  (xm  instead  of  x0),  not  that  g  will  (objectively)  benefit  from 
this  change  under  the  true  state  of  the  world,  sk say.  Formally: 
Ge(xm; Pm) > G”(x”; Pm)+G(xm,  sJ > G(x”, sk).  (5) 
The  updated  beliefs  Pm  concerning  the  state  of  the  world  may  very  well  be 
‘more  wrong’  than  its  prior  beliefs  P”.  Agent  g  may  be  disinformed  or 
cheated  by  signals  (apart  from  being  just  unlucky). 
(b)  Information  with  a  positive  value  does  not  imply  that  g  expects  to  be 
better  off  than  before.  Formally: 
Ge(x m;  Pm) >  Ge(xo; P”)+G’(x”;  Pm) > G’(x”; P”).  (6) 
For  example,  a  threat  to  boycott  (m)  by  a  foreign  government  (f)  may  lead  g 
to  abolish  tariffs  (v(m) > 0),  whereas  g  may  have  felt  more  comfortable  before 
the  new  information,  by  means  of  f’s  threat,  was  received. 
(c)  As  pressure  refers  to  an  influence  attempt,  it  need  not  be  successful  in 
producing  a  behavioural  change.  What  ultimately  counts  here  is,  of  course, 
g’s  perception  and  evaluation  of  the  information  contained  in  f’s  signal. 
Furthermore,  v(m) = 0  (i.e.,  g( Pm) = a(P”))  may  result,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  Pm # P”. 
(d)  It  is  possible  that  g  changes  its  behaviour,  xm = o(P”)  #x’=o(P’)  in 
response  to  new  information  even  if  v(m) = 0.  This  can  occur  only  if g,  having 
‘Strictly  speaking,  a  formal  definition  would  also  require  f“s  beliefs  to  be  formalized. 
However,  formalizing  f’s  beliefs  would  make  the  definition  much  more  complex  without 
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beliefs  Pm,  is  indifferent  between  xm  and  x0,  i.e.,  if  the  set  of  undominated 
actions  (2)  is  not  a  singleton.  This  is  why  the  reverse  of  implication  (4)  does 
not  hold  in  general  (as  will  be  illustrated  below). 
(e)  Usually,  -  especially  in  game  theory  -  it  is  assumed  that  beliefs  (P),  after 
receiving  new  information  (m)  are  updated  according  to  Bayes’  rule.  It  is  then 
assumed  that  g  has  conditional  probabilities  (likelihoods)  C,,i  of  receiving 
information  m  when  the  perceived  state  is  si.  Let  P’=(Py,.  . . ,P;)  denote  g’s 
prior  beliefs,  before  receiving  m.  Then  the  updated  (posterior)  beliefs, 
P"=(Py,...,  P,"),  after  receiving  m,  are,  according  to  Bayes’  rule,  determined 
by: 
(7) 
The  posterior  beliefs  Pm can  be  regarded  as  a  compromise  between  the 
likelihoods  C,,i  and  the  prior  beliefs  P".  In  the  extreme  case  that  agent  g  is 
completely  confident  of  a  particular  state  si  -  i.e.,  PT=  1  -  it  follows  that 
Pm  =  P“;  the  information  m  is  completely  ineffective  (unless  C,,i  =O,  see 
below),  because  g  thinks  to  have  perfect  information.  Another  extreme  case  is 
obtained  if  C,,  j =0  for  all  j #  i,  in  which  case  m  is  conclusive  regarding  a 
particular  state  si  (unless  Pp=O).  A  lot  of  trouble  in  a  sequential  equilibrium 
analysis  (as  will  be  further  discussed  below),  is  due  to  the  possibility  that  g 
gets  information  m  for  which  cj”=  1 C,.j  P;  =O.  In  that  case  g  gets  infor- 
mation  to  which  a  probability  of  zero  is  assigned,  and,  consequently,  Bayes’ 
rule  does  not  apply. 
3.  A  game-theoretical  model  of  political  pressure 
In  this  section  a  model  of  political  pressure  is  presented  which  applies  the 
formal  definition  of  pressure  worked  out  above.  A  formal  model  of  political 
pressure  involves  at  least  two  agents,  an  interest  group  and  a  governmental 
agent,  of  which  at  any  rate  the  latter  is  characterized  by  incomplete 
information.  Furthermore,  the  scheme:  transmission  of  information,  process- 
ing  of  information,  and  acting  in  accordance  with  the  (new)  information,  has 
an  essentially  dynamic  character.  Therefore,  dynamic  game  theory  with 
incomplete  information  seems  to  be  the  almost  ‘natural’  tool  to  model 
political  pressure. 
Such  a  game  between  an  interest  group  and  a  governmental  agent  will  be 
presented  and  analyzed  below.  The  setup  is  deliberately  kept  quite  abstract 
and  simple,  but  such  that  it  satisfies  the  minimum  requirements  for  the 
possible  occurrence  of  pressure  by  the  interest  group.  The  game  involves  a 
very  basic  kind  of  partial  conflict  of  interests,  in  which  potential  signals  by J.  Potters  and  F.  van  Winden,  Modelling  political pressure  69 
the  interest  group  carry  information  on  its  own  future  behaviour.’  Some 
important  and  interesting  questions  that  will  be  addressed  are:  whether  and 
when  does  pressure  arise,  what  is  the  impact  of  pressure,  how  and  when  does 
the  government  anticipate  on,  or  react  to  (potential)  pressure? 
3.1.  The  stage  game 
Assume  that  an  interest  group  f  has  a  preference  (claim)  regarding  the 
behaviour  of  a  governmental  agent  g,  namely,  it  prefers  the  government  g  to 
play  C  (‘Concede’)  rather  than  N  (‘Not  concede’).  The  government  acts  first 
and  there  is  a  threat  that  the  interest  group  will  take  a  response  E  (‘Enforce 
threat’)  in  case  the  government  plays  N  (the  sanction).  It  is  assumed  that  f 
plays  0  (‘not  enforce  the  threat’)  when  g  concedes.  If,  however,  g  does  not 
concede  f  may  choose  either  to  enforce  the  threat  (E)  or  not  (0).  The 
government’s  payoffs  G  are  such  that  it  prefers  to  concede  (only)  if  f  would 
play  E  in  the  case  of  no  concession: 
G(N,  0)  >  G( C, 0)  >  G( N, E).  (8) 
Incomplete  information  enters  the  picture  as  follows.6  It  is  assumed  that  the 
government  is  uncertain  about  the  interest  group’s  payoffs.  The  group  can  be 
of  two  possible  types.  Type  1  (denoted  by  f’)  prefers  not  to  enforce  the 
threat  even  if  the  government  does  not  concede.  Its  payoff  structure  F’  is  as 
follows: 
F’(C,  0)  > F’(N,  0)  >  F’(N,  E).  (9) 
A  group  of  type  2  (denoted  by  f’),  however,  prefers  to  enforce  the  threat  if 
the  government  does  not  concede: 
F’(C,  0)  >  F’(N,  E) > F*(N,  0).  (10) 
5The  game  is  to  some  extent  a  generalization  of  the  model  in  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982b).  See 
also  Backus  and  Driffl  (1985a). 
‘The  literature  on  game  theory  has,  as  yet,  not  provided  a  solution  concept  for  games  with 
incomplete  information.  However,  Harsanyi  (1967,  1968)  proposed  to  transform  a  game  of 
incomplete  information  to  a  game  with  complete  but  imperfect  information  in  the  following  way. 
Harsanyi  assumes  that  at  the  start  of  the  game  the  unknown  elements  in  the  game  -  which 
determine  the  state  of  the  world  -  are  determined  by  a  lottery,  conducted  by  ‘nature’.  The 
probability  distribution  of  this  lottery  is  known  to  all  players,  but  at  least  one  player  will  receive 
only  partial  information  about  the  outcome  of  the  lottery.  A  game  results  with  complete  but 
imperfect  information  in  which  every  player  that  has  received  only  partial  information  forms 
subjective  probabilities  concerning  the  possible  outcomes  of  nature’s  chance  move,  using  its 
partial  information  according  to  Bayes’  rule.  Harsanyi  shows  that  the  Nash  equilibrium  for  this 
game  with  complete  information  corresponds  to  a  ‘Bayesian  equilibrium’  of  the  original  game 
with  incomplete  information.  Harsanyi’s  transformation  is  generally  applied  in  the  literature  on 
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Two  examples  that  tit  this  abstract  general  setup  are  the  following  (other 
examples  are  easily  found). 
(1)  Consider  a  firm  f  which  has  to  decide  whether  (0)  or  not  (E)  to 
undertake  a  certain  (re)investment.  The  firm  prefers  the  (local)  government  g 
to  supply  a  subsidy  (C).  The  interests  of  the  governmental  agent  are  such 
that  it  prefers  the  firm  to  invest;  for  instance,  because  of  the  employment 
attached  to  it,  which  saves  expenditures  on  unemployment  benefits  or 
programs  and  enables  g  to  spend  its  budget  on  more  preferred  matters 
(‘perks’,  public  goods,  financial  support  for  election  campaigns).  The  govern- 
ment  prefers  not  to  subsidize  if  the  firm  would  still  invest.  A  firm  of  type  1 
prefers  to  invest  even  without  subsidy.  It  apparently  has  no  opportunity  to 
invest  more  profitably  in  another  town  or  country  than  g’s  A  firm  of  type  2, 
however,  prefers  to  invest  only  if  it  attains  a  subsidy.  Its  opportunity  costs 
are  such  that  without  a  subsidy  it  is  better  off  by  not  investing  in  g’s 
jurisdiction  (but  elsewhere  or  not  at  all).  Finally,  the  government  is  uncertain 
about  the  type  of  firm  it  faces. 
(2)  A  government  g  prefers  not  to  concede  to  a  wage  claim  (C)  by  a  union  of 
public  sector  workers  f.  If,  however,  g  can  only  avoid  a  strike  (E)  by 
conceding  it  prefers  to  do  so.  The  government  is  not  fully  informed  about  the 
union’s  preferences.  A  type  2  union  prefers  -  for  instance,  because  of  a 
commitment  to  its  members  -  to  strike  if g  does  not  concede.  A  type  1 union 
prefers  not  to  strike  even  if the  government  does  not  concede. 
It  is  easy  to  derive  the  sequential  equilibrium  strategies  of  the  one-period 
(stage)  game.7  Let  x E {C, N)  denote  the  government’s  action  and  y E {E, 0} 
the  interest  group’s  action.  By  assumption  the  interest  group’s  action  is  y = 0 
if  the  government  plays  x=  C.  From  the  payoff  structures  (9)  and  (10)  it  is 
immediately  seem  that  the  optimal  strategies  (pi,  i=  1,2)  for  f’  and  f’  - 
defined  as  the  probability  that  fi  plays  y=  0  if  g  plays  x=  N  -  are, 
respectively: 
p’=l  and  p2=0  (11) 
‘Roughly  speaking,  Kreps  and  Wilson’s  (1982a)  sequential  equilibrium  for  games  with 
incomplete  information  (in  extensive  form)  extends  and  integrates  Harsanyi’s  approach  to  games 
with  incomplete  information  (cf.  footnote  6)  with  the  concept  of  subgame  perfection  [Selten 
(1975)].  A  sequential  equilibrium  involves:  (a)  strategies,  such  that  at  any  point  a  player  takes  an 
action  that  maximizes  its  expected  payoffs,  given  its  current  beliefs  and  given  that  the  other 
players  will  use  their  equilibrium  strategies;  (b)  beliefs  about  nature’s  move,  which  are  consistent 
with  the  initial  beliefs  and  the  equilibrium  strategies,  using  Bayes’  rule  whenever  this  is  possible. 
An  appealing  feature  of  the  sequential  equilibrium  concept  for  the  modelling  of  pressure  (as 
defined)  is,  that  it  explicitly  requires  beliefs  to  be  formed  by  the  players  about  the  uncertain 
elements  in  the  game  (contrary  to,  e.g.,  Selten’s  (1975)  perfect  equilibrium).  Furthermore, 
sequential  equilibria  can  be  computed  relatively  easy  by  means  of  dynamic  programming 
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The  payoffs  (8)  are  such  that  if the  interest  group  were  known  to  be  of  type  1 
the  government  would  not  concede:  x=  N.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  f  were 
known  to  be  of  type  2,  then  g  would  concede:  x =  C.  Put  differently,  only  a 
group  of  type  2  does  ‘really  need’  the  concession  in  order  to  be  induced  to 
play  y = 0.  It  is  assumed  that  g  assigns  an  initial  probability  (belief)  1  -  P  to 
the  case  that  f  is  of  type  1 (state  sl)  and  a  probability  P  that  f  is  of  type  2 
(state  sZ).  The  belief  P  summarizes  all  the  elements  uncertain  to  g. 
Consequently,  in  the  one-period  game  g’s  optimal  strategy  c  (as  a  function  of 
its  beliefs)  is: 
r=o  if  P<cc, 
a(P)  ~[0,1] 
I 
if  P=cL,  (12) 
=l  if  P>cr, 
where  IX:  =  [G(N,  0)  -  G(C,  O)]/[G(N,  0)  -  G(N,  E)].  It  appears  that  the  ‘prob- 
ability’  cr that  g  concedes  is  non-decreasing  in  g’s  belief  P  that  f  is  of  type  2, 
non-increasing  in  the  cost  of  concession  (the  numerator  of  a),  and  non- 
decreasing  in  the  net  cost  of  being  punished  (the  denominator  of  a). 
One  could  argue  that  the  threat  of  punishment  by  f  is  a  form  of  pressure 
which,  in  some  cases,  induces  the  government  to  concede.  However,  note  that 
there  is  no  action  (verbal  or  non-verbal)  by  which  f  aims  to  influence  the 
behaviour  of  g.  The  government  acts  before  the  interest  group.  If  it  concedes 
it  anticipates  f’s  reaction,  but  it  is  not  induced  to  do  so  by  any  action  of  f: 
In  such  cases  we  would  rather  speak  of  structural  coercion  than  of  pressure. 
This  negative  result  is  in  accordance  with  our  contention  at  the  beginning  of 
this  section  that  a  necessary  condition  for  the  occurrence  of  pressure  is  that 
the  model  is  dynamic.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section  we  turn  to  the 
question  whether  pressure  may  occur  if  the  stage  game  is  repeated. 
3.2.  Sequential  equilibrium  of  the  repeated  game 
As  noted  above  an  appealing  feature  of  the  sequential  equilibrium  concept 
for  the  modelling  of  pressure  (as  defined)  is,  that  it  explicitly  requires  beliefs 
to  be  formed  by  the  players  about  the  uncertain  elements  (the  states  of 
nature)  in  the  game.  The  following  notation  will  be  used  to  describe  the 
sequential  equilibria  of  the  repeated  game.  Let  a,(P,)  again  be  the  mixed 
strategy  of  the  government  in  period  t, i.e.,  the  probability  that  it  plays  x, =  C 
when  its  belief  is  P,.  Recall  that  the  interest  group  was  assumed  to  play 
y, = 0  if x, =  C.  Thus,  pf(P,)  denotes  the  mixed  strategy  of  fi  in  period  t,  that 
is,  fi  plays  y,=  0  after  x,=  N  with  probability  of  and  y,=  E  with  probability 
(1 -pi),  given  P,.  It  is  assumed  that  the  initial  probability  P,  that  f  is  of 12  J.  Potters  and  F.  van Winden,  Modelling  political pressure 
type  2  is  exogenous  and  strictly  positive,  that  only  f  knows  its  type,  and, 
that  P,  is  common  knowledge  and  updated  according  to  Bayes’  rule. 
P, + 1(  P,, x,, y,)  denotes  the  belief  in  period  t +  1 when  the  prior  belief  is  P,  and 
the  actions  in  period  t are  x,  and  y,. 
Proposition  1.  The  following  strategies  and  beliefs  constitute  a  sequential 
equilibrium: 
10  if  o~P,<aT~‘+‘, 
a,(P,)=  p 
: 
if  P,=rT--r+l, 
1  ifcc  T~l+l<P,~l, 
i 
l-P,(l-P,)-‘(cc--‘T-‘j-1) 
P:(P,)=  o 
if  PtScL_f, 
{f  P, > CF’, 
(13) 
(14) 
p:(P,)=O  for  all  P,, 
r0 
(15) 
if’  (x,,yJ=(N,O)  or  P,=O, 
p,+ 1(Pn  xt>  YJ  = 1 
p,  if”  (x,,  Y,) = (C,  0)  (16) 
[max  {P,, aT-’  >  if  (x,,yJ=(N,Q  and  P,>Q 
with  a  as  in eq.  (3.5)  and  p: =  [F’(N,  0)  -  F’(N,  E)]/[F’(C,  0)  -  F’(N,  O)].” 
The  proof  is  in  Appendix  A. 
The  sequential  equilibrium  of  Proposition  1  is  not  unique.  In  section  4 
some  other  sequential  equilibria  will  be  discussed.  If  however,  an  additional 
restriction  is  imposed  on  off-equilibrium  beliefs,  the  equilibrium  is  unique. 
Proposition  2.  The  outcome  induced  by  the  equilibrium  of  Proposition  I  is  the 
unique  sequential  equilibrium  outcome  satisfying  Kohlberg  and  Mertens’  (1986) 
criterion  of  invariance  with  respect  to  elimination  of  never  weak  best  responses. 
This  criterion  in  our  model  requires  that  beliefs  after  a  deviation  from  the 
equilibrium  (i.e.,  after  a  zero  probability  event)  are  concentrated  on  the  type 
which  is  ‘most  easily’  induced  to  make  that  deviation  voluntarily.  Again  the 
proof  is  in  Appendix  A  [it  parallels  the  proof  of  Theorem  10.7.1  in  Van 
Damme  (1987)]. 
*For  mathematical  convenience,  the  additional  assumption  F’(N,  0)  -  F’(N,  E) < F’(C,  O)- 
F’(N,  0)  is  made  [cf.  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982b,  p.  265,  remark  A)]. J.  Potters  and  F.  van  Winden,  Modelling  political 
3.3.  Interpretation  of  the equilibrium 
(a)  Consider  the  period(s)  in  which  P,<c?-‘+  ‘.  In  this  case  g  plays  x,=0 
and  f1  plays  a  mixed  strategy  pi,  with  a  strictly  positive  probability  that 
y, = E.  If  y,=  E  results,  this  is  an  in  itself  -  i.e.  for  the  payoffs  in  period  t  - 
costly  action,  since  f’  prefers  to  play  y,=  0.  This  action,  however,  serves  to 
change  g’s  beliefs  P, + I  that  f  is  of  type  2.  Application  of  Bayes’  rule  in  case 
y, = E  implies: 
P t+i=Prob{fistype2(y,=E) 
=  Prob  {f  is type  2 and  y, = E}/Prob  {y, = E} 
PA1  -d) 
=(l-P,)(l-&+P,(l-p:)= 
UT-r>  P,.  (17) 
(Note  that  in  this  model  the  conditional  probabilities  C,,i  in  (7)  are  the 
probabilities  (1 -pi)  that  fi  plays  y, = E).  The  changed  belief  increases  the 
probability  (o,+~(P,+~))  that  g  plays  xt+i  =  C  in  the  next  period  (which  is 
preferred  by  f).  Consequently,  according  to  the  definition  in  section  2,  in 
these  periods,  pressure  is  exerted  by  f’:  it  sends  a  costly  signal.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  mixed  strategy  results  in  y,=  0  then  no  pressure  is  exerted. 
Moreover,  in  the  latter  case  f’  reveals  its  type:  application  of  Bayes’  rule 
yields  P,,  i =O.  The  equilibrium  strategy  shows  that  f  will  thereafter  never 
exert  any  pressure,  no  matter  the  number  of  remaining  periods. 
The  mixed  strategy  1 -p:(P,)  gives  the  probability  that  f’  will  exert 
pressure  in  case  of  no  concession.  We  see  that  this  probability  is  non- 
decreasing  in  P,  and  (T-t),  and,  non-increasing  in  a.  These  results  are 
intuitively  appealing.  We  will  come  back  to  these  factors  below. 
Fig.  1 illustrates  the  development  of  the  beliefs  P,  and  the  ‘threshold  value’ 
aTmt  for  a  numerical  example  (a=0.5,  P,  =O.l,  T=  5). In  the  first  two  periods 
g  concedes,  and  thus:  P,,  1  = P,.  Period  3  is  the  first  in  which  g  does  not 
concede.  Dependent  upon  f’s  action  -  resulting  from  a  mixed  strategy  in 
case  f  is  of  type  1 -  the  belief  P,  drops  to  zero  (if  y,  = 0)  or  increases  to  CL? 
(if  y,=  E).  In  the  latter  case  g,  in  period  4,  plays  a  mixed  strategy  p. 
Dependent  upon  the  actions,  the  belief  P,  remains  the  same  (if  xg=C),  drop 
to  zero  (if  xg = N  and  y,  = 0)  or  increases  to  c1  (if xg =  N  and  ys =  E). 
(b)  The  equilibrium  shows  that  g  concedes  (x,=C)  in  all  periods  t  for 
which,  P,  ~cI~~*+‘.  This  is  due  to  the  anticipating  behaviour  of g:g  takes  full 
account  of  the  fact  that,  when  x,=  N  is  played,  even  the  interest  group  of 
type  1  is  willing  to  enforce  the  threat  (y,=E)  with  a  large  enough 
probability.  This  fact  clearly  illustrates  that  an  interest  group  can  have  an 74  J.  Potters  and  F.  van  Winden,  Modelling  political pressure 
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Fig.  1. The  development  of  the  beliefs  and  the  threshold  value  for  a  numerical  example:  ~(=0.5, 
P,=O.l  and  T=5. 
influence  on  government  behaviour  even  in  the  absence  of  any  actions  by  the 
interest  group  designed  to  influence  government. 
The  equilibrium  strategy  of  the  government  ct  gives  the  factors  -  and  the 
relation  between  them  -  which  determine  the  need  for  f  (type  1)  to  exert 
pressure  in  order  to  induce  g  to  concede.  Firstly,  the  crucial  dependence  of 
the  equilibrium  actions  on  P,  underlines  that  ‘credibility’  or  ‘reputation’  are 
important  assets  of  interest  groups.  Secondly,  the  ratio  (a)  between  the  net 
costs  of  conceding  G(N,O)-G(C,  0)  and  the  cost  of  being  punished  when 
not  conceding  G(N,  O)-G(N,  E)  plays  a  central  role.  The  interest  group 
needs  less  ‘credibility’  or  ‘reputation’,  the  larger  its  potential  to  sanctionize  g, 
and  the  smaller  g’s  costs  of  concession.  Furthermore,  or  shows  that  less 
credibility  (P,)  is  needed  for  g  to  play  x,=C  the  longer  the  number  of 
remaining  periods  (T-t).  This  suggests  that  the  longer  the  period  of 
‘coexistence’,  the  longer  f  can  benefit  from  its  initial  credibility  without 
having  to  face  the  decision  to  exert  pressure  on  g. 
(c)  It  is  important  to  note  that  if f  is  of  type  2  and  plays  y, =  E  after  x, = N, 
this  action  cannot  be  referred  to  as  pressure,  since  this  action  is  not  costly 
for  f’:  F2(N,  E)>  F’(N,  0).  If  f2  enforces  the  threat  this  cannot  be  referred 
to  as  an  influence  attempt.  This  also  illustrates  the  fact  (cf.  section  2)  that  g 
may  perceive  to  be  pressed  by  f  (type  l),  whereas  in  fact  the  change  in 
beliefs  is  a  ‘by-product’  of  an  in  itself  profitable  action  by  f  (type  2).  Of 
course,  in  other  cases  it  may  also  be  the  other  way  around:  pressure  may  not 
be  perceived  as  such  by  the  one  under  pressure. 
(d)  In  this  equilibrium  pressure  is  of  the  disinformatiue  kind.  In  case  the 
interest  group  is  of  type  1,  the  signal  (xI, yJ =(N,  E)  ‘fools’  the  government. 
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Fig.  2. The  payofl’  space  for  g  and  f’. 
Costly  signals  do  not  necessarily  have  to  be  of  this  kind  in  a  game  (although 
often  they  are).  In  section  4  we  will  discuss  a  small  extension  of  the  game 
which  allows  for  the  occurrence  of  a  costly  signal  which  is  informative. 
(e)  Fig.  2  shows  the  stage  payoffs  to  the  government  and  the  interest  group 
of  type  1.  Consider  a  period  t  in  which  g  plays  x,=  N.  If  f  type  1  exerts 
pressure:  y,=E,  then  there  is  a  temporary  inefficient  outcome  C:= 
(G(N,E),  F’(N,E)).  This  outcome,  however,  changes  the  beliefs  such  that  g 
will  play  ot+ 1  = p,  so  there  is  a  positive  probability  that  the  outcome  in 
period  t +  1  will  be  B: = (G(C,  0),  F’(C,  0)).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  f  type  1 
fails  to  exert  pressure:  y, = 0,  then  the  outcome  in  period  t  and  all  remaining 
periods  is  A:=(G(N,  0),  F’(N,O)).  Thus,  the  impact  of  pressure  is  that  it 
causes  a  temporary  inefficient  outcome,  and  forestalls  (with  a  positive 
probability)  a  redistribution  of  the  payoffs  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  agent 
exerting  pressure. 
(f)  It  is  noticeble  that  the  expected  net  benefits  to  f  of  pressure  are  zero. 
This  follows  immediately  from  the  fact  that,  if  there  is  pressure,  it  results 
from  a  mixed  strategy  p:(P,),  which  means  that  f’  is  indifferent  between 
playing  y,=E  (pressure)  and  y,=  0  (no  pressure).  Also  g’s  equilibrium 
strategy  after  observing  the  signal  (x,, y,) =(N,  E)  is  a  mixed  strategy.  The 
updated  beliefs  P,,  1 = ccTet  [see  (17)]  make  g  indifferent  between  x,+i  =  C 
and  xt+r  = N.  So  the  value  of  the  information  contained  in  the  signal  is  zero. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  equilibrium  g  changes  its  behaviour  because  of  the 
signal:  g  now  plays  CJ~+  r( P, + i) = 11, whereas  it  would  have  played  6,+ i(P,)  = 0 
under  the  prior  belief  P,  (cf.  remark  (d)  in  section  2).  Moreover,  this  change 
in  behaviour  is  intended  and  expected  by  f  *. 
The  fact,  that  players  do  not  lose  by  a  unilateral  deviation  from  the 
equilibrium  strategies,  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  ‘weakness’  of  mixed 
strategy  equilibria.’  The  solution  of  a  game,  however,  requires  that  the 
‘This  fact  is  in  some  sense  similar  to  the  feature  of  general  (or  long  run)  equilibrium  models 
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players  coordinate  on  a  (sequential)  equilibrium.  No  player  should  have  an 
incentive  to  deviate  unilaterally.  Furthermore,  Harsanyi  (1973)  has  shown 
that  the  presence  of  small  random  disturbances  in  the  payoffs  may  provide 
an  additional  rationale  for  playing  a  mixed  strategy  equilibrium. 
4.  Some  extensions 
4.1.  Other  sequential  equilibria 
There  are  other  sequential  equilibria  than  the  one  discussed  in  section  3  if 
we  drop  the  additional  restriction  imposed  in  Proposition  2.  These  equilibria 
are  intuitively  very  implausible.  This  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  in  a  sequential 
equilibrium  beliefs  after  an  event  with  a  prior  probability  of  zero  are 
unrestricted,  because  Bayes’  rule  does  not  apply  in  these  cases  (see  remark 
(e),  section  2).  This  allows  the  government  to  ‘threaten’  with  uncredible 
beliefs.  For  instance,  there  are  sequential  equilibria  in  which  g  threatens  to 
update  its  belief  to  P,,  i = 0  after  observing  the  signal  (x, = N, y,=  E).  This 
threat  induces  both  types  of  player  f  to  play:  pf(P,)=  1,  which  in  turn 
justifies  the  belief  P, + I (P,,  N,  E) = 0,  since  x, = N,  y, = E  will  now  not  occur  in 
equilibrium.  Note  that  in  this  sequential  equilibrium  type  2 exerts  pressure,  It 
takes  a  costly  action  (y, = 0  after  x,=  N)  in  order  to  avoid  that  the  belief 
P t+1  drops  to  zero.  Such  an  updated  belief  is  not  ‘plausible’,  however,  since  it 
puts  less  weight  (P,+i  = 0)  on  the  type  (2)  to  which  it  is  less  costly  to  play 
y, = E  after  x, = N. 
4.2.  Incorporating  elections 
The  model  can  also  be  applied  to  the  case  that  the  interest  group  faces  a 
new  government  -  with  the  same  payoff  structure  (8)  -  after  a  fixed  number 
of  periods  (kz  l),  for  instance  because  of  elections.  The  government  can  then 
be  assumed  to  be  interested  only  in  the  payoffs  of  the  k  periods  that  it  is  in 
office.  Surprisingly  as  it  may  seem,  in  this  case  the  equilibrium  strategy  for  a 
government  in  office  in  period  t  appears  to  be  identical  to  the  equilibrium 
strategy  in  period  t  in  the  one-government  case  (provided  that  any  new 
government  can  use  a  record  of  past  actions  and  the  prior  belief  to  form  its 
beliefs).  The  reason  is  that  also  a  temporary  government  will  have  to 
anticipate  the  willingness  of  the  interest  group  to  exert  pressure  in  order  to 
influence  the  beliefs  for  later  governments. 
4.3.  Two-sided  incomplete  icformation 
It  is  relatively  easy  to  incorporate  two-sided  incomplete  information  (and 
discounting)  in  a  continuous  time  version  of  this  type  of  model  [see  Kreps J.  Potters  and  F.  van  Winden,  Modelling  political pressure  17 
and  Wilson  (1982b),  Backus  and  Drifftll  (1985b)].  In  our  example  this  would 
imply  that  there  are  two  possible  types  of  governments,  with  type  1  having 
the  payoff  structure  (8)  and  type  2  having  a  payoff  structure 
G(N,  0)  >  G(N,  E) > G(C,  0).  The  cost  of  concession  for  the  latter  is  so  high  - 
or  the  loss  due  to  punishment  is  so  low  -  that  this  type  has  a  dominant 
strategy  of  never  conceding,  irrespective  of  the  interest  group’s  strategy.  The 
interest  group  does  not  know  for  sure  what  type  of  government  it  is  facing, 
and  forms  subjective  beliefs  concerning  this  incomplete  information. 
Many  characteristics  of  the  equilibrium  of  this  game  are  similar  to  those  of 
the  game  in  section  3.  One  important  difference,  however,  with  the  one-sided 
incomplete  information  model  is,  that  the  probability  of  the  occurrence  of 
pressure  -  causing  Pareto  inefficient  outcomes  -  is  much  larger,  especially  in 
the  initial  periods  of  the  game.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  also  the 
government  (of  type  1)  will  now  try  to  affect  f’s  beliefs  by  not  conceding. 
The  latter  action  is  costly  for  a  government  of  type  1  (if  the  belief  P  is 
relatively  large),  so  it  exerts  pressure  in  these  periods.  This  fact  illustrates 
that  pressure  can  be  two-sided. 
4.4.  Allowing  punishment  after  a  concession 
In  the  stage  game  of  section  3  it  is  assumed  that  the  interest  group  does 
not  enforce  the  threat  in  case  the  government  concedes.  In  Potters  et  al. 
(1989)  a  two-period  repetition  of  the  stage  game  is  analyzed  in  which  the 
interest  group  is  allowed  to  enforce  the  threat  even  after  a  concession.  It  is 
assumed  that  conceding  but  still  being  punished  is  the  worst  alternative  to 
the  government,  that  both  types  of  the  interest  group  gain  from  a  concession 
even  if  they  enforce  the  threat,  but  that  both  types  prefer  not  to  punish  in 
case  of  concession:  F’(C,  0)  >  F’(N,  0)  > F’(C,  E) > F’(N,  E)  and  F2(C,  0)  > 
F2(C,E)>F2(N,  E)>F’(N,  0).  Note  that  in  this  model,  thus,  a  strategy  is 
added  which  is  dominated  in  the  (one-period)  stage  game  for  both  types  of 
the  interest  group. 
A  remarkable  result  is  that  the  strategy  of  enforcing  the  threat  after  a 
concession  for  f’  always  appears  to  be  part  of  a  sequential  equilibrium.”  If 
the  government  concedes,  enforcing  the  threat  is  a  costly  action  for  f’  since 
F2(C,  0)  > F’(C,  E).  So  in  this  case  the  interest  group  of  type  2  exerts 
pressure.  The  motivation  behind  it  is  to  increase  the  belief  P  in  order  to 
secure  concession  in  the  next  period.  Moreover,  in  this  case  pressure  is  of  the 
informative  kind  (cf.  subsection  (e)  in  section  3.3).  If  the  government  is  being 
punished  after  a  concession  it  knows  for  sure  that  it  faces  a  type  2  interest 
group.  Moreover,  in  this  case  the  value  of  the  information  contained  in  the 
“For  certain  parameter  values  it  is  also  the  unique  sequential  equilibrium  strategy  if  we 
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signal  and  the  net  benefits  to  f’  of  exerting  pressure  are  strictly  positive  [cf. 
subsection  3.3(f)]. 
5.  Discussion  and  concluding  remarks 
In  this  final  section  we  shortly  discuss  the  strengths  and  limitations  of  the 
model  of  political  pressure  presented  and  analyzed  above.  Moreover  some 
suggestions  and  perspectives  for  further  research  are  indicated. 
The  most  important  result  of  this  paper  is,  in  our  view,  the  formalization 
of  political  pressure,  in  a  way  enabling  a  rigorous  analysis  of  the  determi- 
nants  and  effects  of  pressure.  Although  political  pressure  is  often  referred  to 
as  an  important  determinant  of  government  behaviour,  the  literature  has  -  to 
the  best  of  our  knowledge  -  so  far  not  provided  a  formal  treatment  of  the 
subject.  Furthermore,  the  model  in  section  3 shows  that  recent  developments 
in  game  theory  -  to  wit,  the  possibility  to  incorporate  incomplete  infor- 
mation  and  the  transmission  of  information  by  means  of  a  sequential 
equilibrium  analysis  -  enable  a  modelling  of  the  defined  phenomenon.  The 
approach  combines  and  illustrates  in  a  formal  way  a  number  of  elements 
that  have  been  deemed  important  in  the  interaction  between  a  government 
and  an  interest  group.  Appels  (1985,  p.  299),  e.g.,  concludes  that  a  ‘feature  of 
the  political  process  which  is  of  prime  importance  in  explaining  enterprise 
subsidies  is  uncertainty’.  Bartlett  (1973)  points  at  the  provision  of  infor- 
mation  by  interest  groups  as  a  fundamental  means  of  non-voting  influence 
on  the  behaviour  of  governmental  agents.  And  Cartwright  (1969,  p.  138),  in 
writing  on  influence  in  general,  states  that  ‘credibility  and  trust  are  essential 
ingredients  of  influence  when  threats  or  promises  are  employed  as  a  means’. 
All  these  elements  are  present  in  our  approach  to  political  pressure. 
Also,  the  model  meets  Johansen’s  (1979,  p.  510)  complaint  about  ‘idyllic 
results,  in  the  sense  that  there  is  never  a  breakdown  of  the  bargaining, 
threats  are  never  carried  out,  and  the  outcomes  are  often  Pareto-optimal’. 
Pressure  -  the  enforcement  of  costly  threats  -  occurs.  Apart  from  causing  a 
temporary  inefficient  outcome,  it  was  shown  to  forestall  a  future  redistribu- 
tion  of  the  payoffs  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  agent  exerting  pressure.  Thus, 
the  model  endogenizes  the  degree  of  (in)etTiciency  and  cooperation  between 
the  players.  Loosely  speaking,  one  could  say  that  due  to  the  willingness  of 
the  interest  group  to  exert  pressure,  the  government  is  more  or  less  forced  to 
take  account  of  the  interests  of  the  group.  This  is  an  important  and 
interesting  result,  for  it  shows  that  such  a  type  of  model  can  provide 
information  on  the  conditions  under  which  it  is  more  or  less  justified  to 
model  government  behaviour  by  means  of  the  maximization  of  a  weighed 
representation  of  the  separate  utilities  of  the  government  and  the  interest 
group(s),  as  in  Van  Velthoven  and  Van  Winden  (1986)  and  Zusman  (1976). 
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factors  that  are  important  in  the  determination  of  the  power  weight(s)  of  the 
interest  group(s)  in  such  a  weighed  representation.  For  instance,  the  model  of 
section  3  showed  the  significance  of  (the  relation  between)  the  costs  of  the 
interest  group’s  claim,  its  potential  to  sanctionize  the  government’s  actions, 
its  credibility  (reputation),  and  the  number  of  remaining  periods  of 
coexistence. 
For  a  balanced  view  it  is  important,  however,  that  some  limitations  of  the 
present  state  of  the  art  of  game-theoretical  models  with  incomplete  infor- 
mation  are  mentioned  here.  First,  the  descriptive  power  of  sequential 
equilibria  of  games  with  incomplete  information  may  be  limited  because  of 
the  multiplicity  of  equilibria  that  often  exists.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact 
that  off-equilibrium  beliefs  are  unrestricted  (cf.  section  4.1).  Only  occasion- 
ally,  additional  restrictions  on  the  beliefs  can  be  helpful  to  select  a  unique 
equilibrium  [cf.  Potters  et  al.  (1989)].  A  related  point  is  that  the  equilibrium 
is  often  very  sensitive  to  modelling  details  [cf.  Fudenberg  and  Maskin  (1986), 
Ledyard  (1986)].  Therefore,  as  a  positive  theory  this  approach  has  to  be 
applied  with  some  care. 
Another  point  is  that  game  models  with  incomplete  information  often  have 
to  be  quite  limited  in  institutional  richness  in  order  to  remain  tractable.  For 
instance,  only  one-sided  incomplete  information  is  assumed,  or  only  two 
possible  ‘types’  (states  of  the  world),  two  players,  two  possible  actions,  or, 
only  one  time  period.  At  least  some  of  these  limitations  may,  however,  be 
removed  in  the  near  future,  for  the  way  game  theory  has  developed  recently 
seems  to  justify  optimistic  expectations  in  this  respect. 
Note  that  in  the  model  of  section  3  the  kind  of  pressure  that  can  occur  is 
given.  Pressure  is  of  the  kind  where  the  contingent  sanction  on  the 
government’s  action  is  due  to  the  pressure  group  itself,  and  where  the  signal 
is  transmitted  by  means  of  an  enforcement  of  a  ‘physical’  threat,  which 
directly  affects  the  payoffs  and  does  not  rely  on  ‘verbal’  communication. 
There  are  other  kinds  of  pressure,  though  (cf.  section  2).  A  second  important 
kind  is  one  in  which  the  contingent  sanction  is  again  applied  by  the  interest 
group,  but  where  the  signal  is  transmitted  by  means  of  a  ‘verbal’  action 
(which  presupposes  direct  communication).”  This  kind  of  pressure  can 
occur,  for  instance,  in  a  strategic  bargaining  model  with  incomplete  infor- 
mation,  in  which  two  players  bargain  over  the  division  of  a  ‘cake’  of  fixed 
size  [for  a  review  of  models  of  this  type,  see  the  articles  in  Roth  (1985)].  The 
player  with  the  private  information  (the  interest  group  f)  can  reject  offers  by 
the  other  player  (the  government  g),  or  make  certain  (counter)offers,  in  order 
to  influence  g’s  beliefs  about  f’s  payoff  function  and  induce  g  to  make  or 
accept  offers  favourable  to  J  Such  rejections  and  (counter)offers  can  be 
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costly  because  of  the  time  delay  involved,  and  the  possibility  of  disagreement, 
and  can  thus  be  referred  to  as  pressure.  The  third  main  kind  of  pressure,  is 
one  where  the  interest  group  transmits  information,  through  direct  communi- 
cation,  about  a  contingent  sanction  which  is  applied  by  another  agent. 
Costly  signals  that  occur  in  certain  principal  agent  models  may  be  translated 
to  this  kind  of  pressure. 
These  (three)  different  kinds  of  pressure  can  be  classified  according  to,  on 
the  one  hand,  the  direct  effect  on  the  payoffs  (the  costs  of  the  signals  to  both 
the  interest  group  and  the  government),  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
inferential  effect  (the  impact  on  the  government’s  beliefs).  Both  effects  are 
probably  strongest  when  pressure  is  of  the  first  kind,  mentioned  above,  and 
again  stronger  in  the  second  than  in  the  third  kind.  The  latter  two  types  of 
pressure,  however,  presuppose  access  to  the  government  as  they  involve 
direct  communication.  The  major  difference  between  the  second  and  third 
kind  of  pressure  is  that  the  latter  relies  on  the  interest  group’s  ‘expertise’  on 
the  behaviour  of  other  agent’s,  which,  moreover,  should  be  acknowledged  to 
some  degree  by  the  government.12 
An  important  line  of  further  research  would  be  to  endogenize  the  kind  of 
pressure.  It  would  be  very  interesting  if  a  model  could  be  constructed  in 
which  the  choice  of  the  kind  of  pressure  by  the  interest  group  could  be 
related  to  such  factors  as  the  type  and  amount  of  incomplete  information  by 
the  government,  the  credibility  of  the  interest  group,  its  access  to  the  policy 
maker,  and  the  ‘distance’  between  their  interests.  Such  a  model  could  help  to 
explain  the  (alleged)  increased  importance  of  interest  group  pressure  of  the 
second  and  third  kind,  relative  to  pressure  of  the  first  type  mentioned  above. 
We  hope  that  the  present  paper  helps  to  provide  a  basis  for  such  a  model. 
Appendix  A 
Proof  of Proposition  1.  The  proof  is  by  induction  on  the  number  of  periods. 
To  simplify  the  analysis  the  payoff  functions  are  normalized  by  the  following 
afftne  transformations  (to  which  the  sequential  equilibrium  concept  is 
invariant): 
Gij:=  [G(i,j)-G(C,O)]/[G(N.O)-G(C,O)], 
Ft : =  [F”(i,j)  -  Fk(N,  O)]/[Fk(C,  0)  -  Fk(N,  O)],  k =  1,2, 
where  ic  (C,  N}  and  j  E {E,O}. 
From  the  constraints  (S)+lO)  and  footnote  6 it  follows: 
“In  all  three  kinds  of  pressure  the  signal  can,  of  course,  be  of  the  informative  or  the 
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G,,=O,  G,,=  1, G,,<O,  Fk,,=O,  Fk,,=  1,  -  1 <F,&<O, 
F,& > 0,  k =  1,2. 
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Furthermore,  CI  = (1 -  G,,)  _ ’  and  p =  -  FkE,  with  0 < c(, p <  1. 
It  will  also  be  proved  in  the  sequel  that  the  (recursively  defined) 
normalized  value  functions,  when  playing  the  equilibrium,  for  t =  1,. . . , T and 
given  P,,  for  g,  f’,  and  f2,  respectively,  are: 
w”(  t, P,) = 
i 
T-t+l-PP,(cr~(T-f+l)-l)(l-~))l  if  Pt~~T-r+‘~ 
wyt  +  1, P,)  if  P,>ccTmrfl,  (A.l) 
1 
0  if  P,<aTm’+  ‘, 
w’(r,  P,) =  p  if  PI=c(Tm’+l,  (A.21 
1 +w’(t+  l,P,)  if  Pt>ccTm’+l, 
I 
F;,+w2(t+  1,~~~‘)  if  Pt<ctm*+l, 
/L[l+W2(t+1,c?r+1)] 
w2( t, P,) =  (A.3) 
+(l-p)[F&+w2(t+1,CrT-‘)I  if  Pt=!.x-‘+l, 
1 + w2(t +  1, P,)  if  P,>aTmr+‘, 
where  w’(T+l,P,+,):=O  for  i=g,1,2.  Define  p,:=(l-P,)p:+P,pf,  the 
expected  mixed  strategy  of  f  by  g.  For  convenience  the  dependence  of  the 
strategies  on  P,  will  sometimes  be  suppressed. 
(a)  It  will  first  be  verified  that  the  beliefs 
rule,  whenever  it  applies.  If  Bayes’  rule  does 
conjectures’  [cf.  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982b)]. 
(i)  P,,  l(P,,  C, 0)  = P,  This  follows  directly 
f  2 are  assumed  to  play  X, = 0  after  y, =  C. 
(16)  are  consistent  with  Bayes’ 
not  apply  we  will  use  ‘plausible 
from  the  fact  that  both  f’  and 
Q,z’p,‘~o  I- 
P,(PJ 
if  PtsuaTmf, 
(4  P,+ l(P,,  N, 0)  = 
O(orEIO,~T~r])  if  P,>rTm’ 
I  (Bayes’  rule  does  not  apply), 82  J. 
I 
0  if  P,=O 
(Bayes’  rule  does  not  apply), 
(iii)  P,+r(P,,N,E)=  p,(I_!I,“(p,))=,~~t  if 
1 
1  -PAP,) 
p  lClrmt 
*-  9 
I  p,  if  P,>cc-‘, 
(b)  The  assessments  (13)+16)  and  (A.l))(A.3)  are  easily  checked  for  t =  T 
(cf.  the  stage  game  in  section  3.1).  Now  assume  that  the  equilibrium 
strategies,  beliefs  and  value  functions  are  as  in  (13)+16)  and  (A.l)-(A.3)  for 
period  r.  Let  Ff(P,)  be  the  expected  payoffs  to  type  k  from  period  t  onward 
when  g  plays  X, = N  and  the  equilibrium  strategies  are  played  in  the  periods 
t+  1 to  7: Then  it  follows  for  period  t-  1: 
For  f  type  1: 
I 
P:~,u”(t,0)+(1-pp:_,)[F~,+w’(t,0)]=(1-pp:~,)F~, 
if  Ptml=O, 
F:ml(P,ml)=  I 
p:-rw’(t,o)+(l  -p:~l)[F~,+w’(t,?T~‘+l)]=O 
if  O<P,_l~aT-t+l, 
P:-Iw’(t>0)+(1  -P:-1)CF~,+w’(t,P,~,)l 
if  Ptml>aTp’+‘, 
which  induces  (and  justifies  the  randomization  if 0 < P,-  1 5  CX-‘+~): 
=  l-P,_l(l-P,~,)-‘(cc~(T~(t~l)+l’-l) 
i 
if  P,_r~!x*~‘+‘, 
0  if  P,_l  >LY-‘+‘. 
For  f  type  2: 
F:-  l(P,- 1) 
= 
i 
P:-1W2(~~o)+(1  -Pf-1)C~;,+w2(t,0)1  if  P,_l=O, 
P:-~W2(t,0)+(1-pP:-1)[F~E+w2(t,max{P,~,,crT-’+1})]  if  Ptm,>O, 
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P:_~(P,_~)=O  for  all  P,. 
Finally,  for  g: 
If  P,_l  =o: 
G,_1(P,_1)=a,_,{T-t+l}+(1-a,_,){T-t+2}. 
If  P,-l  >o: 
G,-,(P,-,)=o,-,Cwg(t,P,-,)1+(1-o,-,)Cp,-,(P,-,){1+~g(t,O)} 
+(I -Pt-l(P,~,)){GNE+wg(t,max  (f’-l,~Tpf+l})}l 
= I 
f&l{  -  1 +p,_,cc-  (-+2))+T_t+2 
-Pf_l(cc-(T-f+2)-  l)(l  -c()_’  if  0<Ptp15aTm'+' 
~,-,w~(~,P~~~)+(~-~~-~)CGNE+W~(~,P~~~)I 
if  c~~-‘+~<P~_~~l 
Maximization  of  G, _ l(P,  1)  yields 
1 
0  if  PtpI<ctrmt+2, 
a,_l(P,ml)=  p  if  Pt_l=tlT-t+2, 
1  if  Ptm1>ccT-t+2. 
From  the  equilibrium  strategies  it  follows  easily  that 
w9(t-l,P,_,)= 
i 
T-t+2-P,_,(cc-(T~‘+2)-1)(1-~)p1  if  P,_1s~Tmt+2, 
w9(t, P, - 1)  if  Pt_1>~T-r+2, 
: 
0  if  P,_l<~T-'+2, 
w’(t-l,P,_,)=  p  if  Ptml=ctT-r+2, 
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w2(t-l,P,_J= 
F~,+w~(~,c~~-~+~)  if  Pt_1<ccT-‘+2, 
r*[l  +MJ2(t,C(Tm~+2  )l+(l-I*)[F~,+W2(t,~T-t+l)] 
if  Pt_1=~T-1+2, 
1 + w2(t, P,.-  1)  if  Pt_l>~Tmt+2. 
Q.E.D. 
The  extra  condition  on  the  beliefs.  First,  the  extra  condition,  used  in  the 
uniqueness  proof  of  Proposition  2,  will  be  formalized  in  terms  of  a  condition 
on  the  beliefs  after  a  zero-probability  event.  Van  Damme  (1987,  p.  281)  notes 
that  this  condition  follows  from  Kohlberg  and  Mertens’  (1986)  criterion  of 
‘invariance  to  elimination  of  never  weak  best  responses’.  The  criterion 
requires  that  beliefs  after  a  deviation  from  the  equilibrium  are  concentrated 
on  the  type  which  is  most  easily  induced  to  make  that  deviation  voluntary. 
Suppose  (P,,y,)  is  an  ‘event’  after  x,=  N  with  probability  zero  if  a 
particular  equilibrium  e  (a:,  p:‘;  k =  1,2,  t =  1,. .  , T)  is  played.  A  zero- 
probability  event  can  only  occur  if  pp(P,):  =  (1 -  P,)p:‘+  P,pf’=  1 while  y, =  E 
or  pF(P,)  =0  while  y,=  0.  In  both  cases  the  posterior  belief  P,,  l(P,,  x,,  y,) 
cannot  be  determined  by  Bayes’  rule.  Let  Ff  now  be  the  total  expected 
payoffs  to  f”  from  period  t till  7; given  P,,  when  playing  pf  after  x,=  N: 
+(1-p:){Fk,,+Wk(t+l,Pt+l(Pt,N,E))} 
Now,  consider  the  case  that  (x,,yJ=(N,  E)  is  the  event  that  occurs,  while 
having  prior  probability  zero,  that  is,  &(P,)=  1.  [The  case  for  (x,,yJ=(N,O) 
is  similar.] 
Define  pk  as  the  set  of  posterior  beliefs  after  (N,  E)  that  would  make  f” 
deviate  from  its  proposed  equilibrium  strategy  pf”(P,).  That  is: 
Then  the  criterion  requires  that  in  an  equilibrium  e,  after  the  zero  probability 
event  (x,, y,) =(N,  E),  beliefs  are  updated  according  to: 
: 
=l  if  9’  cg2, 
P,+l(P,,N,E)  =0  if  ,oP1x.Y2,  (A.4) 
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Note,  that  the  requirement  is  invariant  with  respect  to  affine  transforma- 
tions  of  payoff  function,  which  justifies  our  normalization. 
Proof  of  Proposition  2.  First  it  should  be  noted  that  the  uniqueness  result 
only  concerns  the  equilibrium  outcome  (the  probability  distribution  over  end- 
nodes  in  the  extensive  form  of  the  game).  Off  the  equilibrium  beliefs  and 
strategies  are  not  always  unique.  Furthermore,  to  ensure  uniqueness  also  the 
non-degeneracy  condition  P,  #a’,  Vt  is  necessary.  The  proof  is  by  induction 
on  the  number  of  periods  and  parallels  the  pr-of  of  Theorem  10.7.1  in  Van 
Damme  ( 1987). 
It  can  be  seen  from  the  stage  game,  that  the  equilibrium  strategies  for 
period  T  are  unique  except  for  the  case  P,=a.  Below  it  will  be  shown  that 
the  value  o,(u)=~  (=  -Fk,)  is  necessary  in  the  sequential  equilibrium. 
Assume  that  for  period  t  the  unique  sequential  equilibrium  strategies 
satisfying  the  extra  criterion  on  the  beliefs  are  as  in  (13))( 1.5) with  corres- 
ponding  value  functions  (A.l)+A.3).  Now,  consider  period  t-  1.  It  will  first 
be  shown,  by  contradiction,  that  for  the  equilibrium  strategies: 
/~:_r(P,_,)<l  and  P~_~(P,_~)=O  if  P,_,>O.  (A.3 
(a)  Assume 
~:_,(P,_r)=l  and  pf-r(P,_,)<l.  (A.6) 
Consistency  with  Bayes’  rule  then  implies  that 
P,(P,_,,N,E)=l  and  P,(P,_l,N,O)<P,_l 
Thus 




Consistency  now  implies  P,( P,  1, N,  0)  =  0,  so 
F:_I(P,_,,  l)=\v’(t,O)=O,  whereas 
K-1  (P,  ,,O)=F~,+w’(t,l)=F;,+T-t+l>O. 
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(b)  Assume 
P:_~(P~_~)=~  and  p:_l(P,_l)=l.  (A.7) 
Consistency  implies:  P,( P,_  r, N, 0)  = P,_  1 and  P,(P,_  r, N, E)  is  free.  (A.7)  can 
only  be  an  equilibrium  if 
F,&+w’(t,P,m,)2  F;,+w2(t,P,(P,m,,  N,E)).  (A.9) 
Since  FA,<O,  whereas  Fi,>O,  it  follows  that  (A.8)  is  satisfied  whenever 
P,ml~P,(P,ml,N,E)  while  (A.9)  requires  P,_l>P,(P,_l,N,E).  This  in  turn 
implies  that  .Y’ c  .P2.  The  above  criterion  on  the  beliefs  thus  requires 
P,(P,-  1, N, E) =  1. But  then  (A.9)  can  never  hold,  and  this  contradicts  (A.7). 
Combining  the  conclusions  from  (a)  and  (b)  yields:  p:_l(P,pl)<  1 if  Ptml  ~0. 
Thus:  Fko  + ul’(t, P,(P,_  1, N, 0))  -  w’(t,  P,(P,-  1, N, E)) 2  FiE  < 0,  so  we  must 
have  P,( P,  1, N, 0)  < P,( P, _ , , N, E). 
For  j”  it  will  then  hold  that:  w2(t, P,(P,-,,  N, 0))  < w2(t, P,(P,_  1, N,E))  + 
FL.  In  equilibrium  f”  will  therefore  play:  pf_ *(P,_  1) = 0  V P,-  1 > 0.  This 
establishes  the  claim  (AS),  and,  furthermore,  that  P,(P,_  1, N, 0)  =O. 
(c)  Now,  assume  that  O<p:p,(P,m,)<  1. Then  (A.8)  must  hold  with  equality: 
w’(t,  P,(Plm 1, N, E) =  -  F,hE. This  requires  that  P,(P,_  1, N, E) =ctmt+‘.  Thus 
Pr-- ICI -PL(P,~l)l  P,(P,_l,N,E)=pp  T-t+1 
(1-P,_,)[l  -pp:~,(P,J~+p,==  ’ 
(A. 10) 
or,  equivalently 
(A.1 1) 
Since  p:_rsl,  (A.ll)  can  only  hold  for  P,_lzctmt+l.  So,  if PI_,>ccmt+l  we 
must  have: 
p:-  ,(PfFl)=O. 
This  proves  the  uniqueness  of  the  equilibrium  strategies  of  both  types  of 
player  jI 
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which  induces: 
r 
0  if  Pt_1<c(T-1+2, 
CT_~(P,-~)=  p  if  P,-1=rrpt+2, 
i 
[l  if  Pt_l>fx-t+2, 
where  p  must  be  such  as  to  make  f  ’  indifferent  in  period  t -2  between 
playing  pi-l(P,_l)=l  and  p:pl(P,_l)=O  if  P,_,~~x-~+~,  that  is: 
w’(t-1,0)=F~E+W1(t-l,IYT-f+2  ) which  can  only  hold  if p =  -  FkE. 
Summarizing:  in  any  sequential  equilibrium  satisfying  the  extra  criterion  on 
the  beliefs  the  strategies  must  be  as  stated  in  equations  ( 13)4  15).  Q.E.D. 
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